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Since 2006 the checkpoints along the borders of the West Bank and the Gaza strip have been reorganized 
and equipped with a new technological platform. They are now managed by private security firms. The 
instigators of these reforms speak of the “civilianization” of the checkpoints and justify their program 
on economic, organizational and humanitarian grounds. This detailed study of the concrete means by 
which the management of the Israeli checkpoints has been outsourced and commodified enables one 
to establish links between the evolution of Israeli society in terms of the relationship between the state, 
the market, and society and the actual changes in the operation of the occupation. It would appear that 
this is not a case of the state receding in the face of market forces in a zero sum game. Rather it is the 
redeployment in a neoliberal context of the state in which it has adopted the uniquely Israeli layering 
of the public and the private, the national and the international, the state and civil society. 
Depuis 2006, les checkpoints situés le long des limites de la Cisjordanie et de la bande de Gaza ont été 
réaménagés et équipés d’une nouvelle plateforme technologique. Leur gestion a également été déléguée 
à des entreprises de sécurité privées. Les initiateurs de ces réformes ont évoqué une « citoyennisation » 
des « passages » et justifié leur démarche au nom d’une rationalité économique, organisationnelle et 
humanitaire. L’étude détaillée des modalités concrètes d’externalisation et de marchandisation de la 
gestion des checkpoints israéliens permet d’établir des liens entre évolutions internes de la société 
israélienne, au niveau des rapports entre Etat, marché et société, et transformations actuelles du dispositif 
de l’occupation. Il semble que l’on soit en présence non pas d’un retrait de l’Etat face aux forces du 
marché, dans ce qui est imaginé comme un jeu à somme nulle, mais d’un redéploiement dans un 
contexte néolibéral, qui renvoie à des formules locales et particulières de chevauchement entre public 
et privé, national et international, sphère étatique et sphère d’une société dite civile.
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Since 2006, management of the checkpoints located along the border of the West Bank 
and the Gaza strip has been delegated to private security contractors. The instigators of these 
reforms speak of the “civilianization” of the checkpoints (izruach ha’ma’avarim)1 and justify 
their program on economic, organizational, and humanitarian grounds.
Changes in the management of what I refer to as “border checkpoints”2 contribute, along with 
the construction of the separation barrier, to radically altering the geography of the occupation, 
which reflects a plan to perpetuate and “normalize” a boundary unilaterally drawn by the state 
of Israel while maintaining control over the entire territory. One aspect of such control is the 
installation of a new system for screening the movement of persons and goods at checkpoints, 
which have been reorganized and equipped with a new technological platform.
I chose to analyze this reform not through the often traumatic effects it can have on the lives 
of the occupied Palestinian population, on Israeli-Palestinian relations, or on the Palestinian 
economy, but through the domestic political significance it has for the state of Israel. More 
specifically, I will analyze its interlocking mechanisms, i.e. the new articulations it creates 
between the state, the army, and the market. This option removes us from the drama played 
out on the scene of checkpoints: the violence and humiliation, arrests of suspicious persons, 
land annexation and the creation of enclaves, Israeli regulation of the Palestinian economy 
through restrictions on movement, and so on. It shifts the focus to the wings, providing a better 
1 The Hebrew word izruach does not appear in the dictionary; it is a neologism coined from the root meaning 
“civilian” or “citizen.” The verb le’azreach means “to naturalize,” to grant someone citizenship or make a person 
a citizen. It has been translated in English as “civilianize” and “civilianized.” In this essay I will use the terms 
“civilianization” and “civilianize,” which have already been introduced by other authors.
2 Like the separation barrier, the large majority of these checkpoints, considered as “the final crossing point 
before entering Israel,” are nevertheless located east of the Green Line (demarcation line agreed by the Arab 
countries and Israel in the 1949 armistice), hence inside the borders of what are internationally recognized as 
occupied Palestinian territories. However, to highlight the process of spatial reorganization that they induce and 
to distinguish them from checkpoints located east of the separation barrier, I will call these crossing points border 
checkpoints.
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understanding of changes occurring in the Israeli political sphere by examining in detail the 
practical and administrative modes of outsourcing. This choice rests on the hypothesis that it is 
impossible to interpret the current reorganization of the occupation and the borderlands along 
a model of unilateral separation solely in terms of a military response to a security threat or a 
response to a “legitimacy crisis” affecting the army, deemed unfit to handle sensitive missions. 
I in fact maintain that this reorganization is closely related to current transformations in Israeli 
society. I will thus suggest an analysis of checkpoint management outsourcing that examines 
the restructuring of the role and modes of state intervention, the restructuring of a private 
security services market, changes in the Israeli labor market, and the specific features of the 
web of actors involved in this process. This analysis intends to demonstrate that we are not so 
much witnessing a retreat of the state in the face of market forces in what is thought to be a 
zero sum game than we are the redeployment of the state in a neoliberal context. Indeed, this 
reform reflects specific local modes of association between public and private, national and 
international and the state and so-called civil society.
Political History of Israeli Checkpoints and Restrictions on Movement
The current checkpoint management reform can only be understood within its historical 
and political framework. Space not allowing for a complete survey of the political history of 
checkpoints and restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories,3 I 
will only mention some fundamental aspects.
First, it should be remembered that border checkpoints are a fairly recent phenomenon in the 
history of the occupation and administration of the Palestinian population. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
there was little control over Palestinian entrance into Israel; this policy moreover constituted 
one of the factors of the Palestinian economy’s dependence on the Israeli economy.4 It was 
only in the early 1990s that the situation began to change. In January 1991, blanket permission 
to enter was rescinded, and this ban was made effective beginning in March 1993, with the 
declaration of the full closure of the Occupied Territories, amounting to an unlimited state of 
siege. From that time on, any Palestinian wishing to enter Israel was required to have a permit 
issued in his name and for precise motives.5 This restriction was concretized by the erection of 
checkpoints along the roads linking the Palestinian territories to Israel. Peace negotiations and 
the various accords signed in the 1990s between the state of Israel and Palestinian leaders did 
nothing to ease this constraint, on the contrary.6 In 1994, a “security barrier” (gader bitahon) 
3 For an analysis of the political history of checkpoint privatization, see Havkin, 2008 and Havkin, 2011. On 
the political history of the occupation, see Farsakh, 2005; Gordon, 2008; Azoulay and Ophir, 2008; Ophir, Givoni 
and Hanafi (eds), 2009; Weizman, 2007.
4 Between 1987 and 1988, just before the outbreak of the first Intifada (general uprising of the Palestinian 
population against Israeli occupation, between 1987 and 1993), 39 % of the active Palestinian population was 
employed in Israel. Swirski, 2005: 35; Farsakh, 2005.
5 Kemp and Raijman, 2008; Handel, 2007; B’Tselem, 2007.
6 Farsakh, 2000: 22-25.
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was built around the Gaza Strip and, in January 1995, the Israeli government decided to effect 
a separation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Dozens of crossing points were 
thus erected in the “seam zone” (the buffer zone), in order to control and monitor the passage of 
vehicles, goods, and pedestrians between the West Bank or the Gaza Strip and Israel. However, 
due to the absence of a physical separation, the effectiveness of this system remained limited. It 
was only after the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 that the plan to construct a physical 
barrier was concretized. Construction of what is officially known as the Separation Barrier 
(michshol hafrada) was decided in 2002 and got underway in 2003.7 This structure, the largest 
civil engineering project undertaken by the state of Israel since its creation, aims to prevent 
suicide attacks, and its location was designed to separate the populations while keeping as 
much land as possible on the Israeli side.8 At the end of 2009, over 400 kilometers of barrier 
had been constructed, which represents only 58 % of the goal.9 Border checkpoints are an 
integral part of this unilateral separation device. Given that they are the only legal crossing 
points for persons and goods to and from the Occupied Territories, these interfaces between 
the Palestinian and Israeli societies and economies are not only the loci of meetings but also 
of heightened tensions.
Outsourcing the Checkpoints
From the moment construction of the separation barrier began, the Israeli government decided 
to outsource management of the border checkpoints, which until then had been operated by the 
police or the army, and entrust it to private security contractors. The stated goal was to “reduce 
the friction at (military) checkpoints and to increase the level of service, without decreasing 
the level of security screening. Checkpoints will be defined as official border crossings and 
will look just like terminals do elsewhere in the world.”10 
The word “privatization” is imprecise, and can therefore lead to confusion. I thus prefer to 
use two terms—outsourcing and commodification—which each refer to a specific aspect of 
what privatization denotes. Outsourcing should be understood as a strategic management tool, 
which according to the standard definition aims to increase the efficiency of an institution or 
enterprise by enabling it to concentrate on its sphere of activity and subcontract out anything 
that is not part of this sphere. By commodification, I mean the extension of the domain of 
what can be bought and sold on the market by the transformation of goods or services into 
7 The terms “separation obstacle” and “security obstacle” (michshol bitahon) are those most frequently used 
by the Israeli authorities to denote a construction that is made up of a complex system of patrol roads, fences, 
gates, and in some places, a concrete wall over 20 feet high. Israeli and Palestinian opponents to the project tend 
to use the term “wall” (homa) to emphasize its oppressive nature. In this article it is referred to by the seemingly 
less controversial term “barrier.”
8 Arieli and Sfard, 2008.
9 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, November 2009.
10 Knesset Research and Information Center, 2006. All translations from Hebrew were made in collaboration 
with the author.
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commodities as well as the development of markets for these goods. These two terms will 
enable me to treat two majors aspects of the reform analyzed, as the first pertains to the 
redefinition and redeployment of the state, while the second relates to the transformation 
of security into a commodity and to the new connections between the state and the market 
generated in the process.
The first outsourcing of a checkpoint took place in January 2006. Today, operation of the 
majority of the 34 border checkpoints has been outsourced to private contractors.11 Differences 
exist, however, not only between regions but also between checkpoints, depending on whether 
they are designed for Palestinian pedestrians (13 in the West Bank, four of which are designed 
solely for the inhabitants of Palestinian enclaves cut off from the rest of the West Bank by the 
Barrier), solely for Israelis (17 in the West Bank), or for the transfer of goods to and from Israel 
(six in the West Bank and, currently, only one in Gaza, used by the Palestinians), some of 
them having several functions. The transfer of goods (except for those produced in the Israeli 
settlements) follows a back-to-back procedure, which involves unloading the goods on one 
side of the checkpoint and loading them on another truck on the other side. The checkpoints 
at the entrance to the Gaza Strip are located along the Green Line and were the first to be 
manned by private operators. However, these checkpoints have been closed or have had their 
operations considerably reduced since the blockade was imposed on Gaza in June 2007. Among 
those designed for the Palestinians, located at different points in the West Bank and officially 
considered as “the final points of passage before entering Israel,” only three are along the 
Green Line, the others being located several kilometers to the East, inside Palestinian territory. 
Although operated by private security contractors, official management of these places comes 
under the purview of the Crossing Directorate (minhelet hama’avarim) created in 2005 and 
converted into the Crossing Authority in 2010 (rashut hama’avarim), the term that will be used 
to refer to this agency hereinafter. The case of checkpoints in the East Jerusalem area (otef 
yerushalayim) is more ambiguous, as they are currently in an intermediary situation: outsourcing 
there is not officially complete, and so they are staffed by a heterogeneous “assemblage” of 
military personnel, police, and private contractors, while responsibility for their operations is 
delegated to the Israeli police who have ultimate decision-making authority.
The “terminals” built after the reform do not resemble the more or less makeshift concrete 
structures and military installations that have become a symbol of the occupation’s brutality, 
especially in the years following the outbreak of the second Intifada. The diagram of a checkpoint 
published in the tender open to private company bids describes an inspection route that is 
very similar to what is found in airports. Passage from the “Israeli” side to the “Palestinian” 
side, according to the terms used in official documents, is made up of two main stations. 
First, passengers and baggage go through a scanner and metal detector for inspection, then 
documents—ID card or passport and permit—are inspected and the passage is registered 
electronically. Checkpoint entrance and passage from one inspection station to another are 
controlled by large turnstiles operated from booths. If an inspector decides to proceed with 
11 See map in appendix.
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further security screening, the inspected person is directed toward a body search cell and then 
another equipped with an explosive detection system (merihan).12
Despite their similarities, the Israeli checkpoints differ from other screening systems characteristic 
of other border terminals on at least two accounts. First of all, they are not located at a 
recognized border demarcating two sovereign entities. They merely separate an Israeli territory 
from a territory occupied and governed by Israel. Second, the difference in attitude toward 
the populations is evident: while Palestinian vehicles are strictly forbidden from circulating 
in Israel, Israeli vehicles can circulate freely on the roads of the West Bank. Moreover, the 
checkpoints designed for Palestinians carry out stringent inspection procedures whereas those 
designed for Israelis are control posts that more resemble highway tollgates. Except in the event 
of suspicion, Israeli cars are rarely inspected.
REDEPLOYMENT OF THE STATE
Most studies on the privatization of security, a thriving research field since the 1990s, start 
by noting a loss of state sovereignty with respect to market forces. According to the authors of 
these numerous studies, the state is said to have become too weak or insufficiently competent 
to retain the monopoly of legitimate violence and is thus obliged to delegate this sovereign 
function to a third party. The privatization of security thus supposedly indicates a crack in 
the edifice of sovereignty, a “crisis” of the state, unable to cope with competing forms of 
organization in the era of globalization. This approach is often criticized for its static and 
ahistoric interpretation of sovereignty, for the binary distinction it makes between state and 
market, and for the essentialism underlying the definition of these concepts.13 My reasoning 
subscribes to this critical approach.
The study of the implementation of this reform first of all shows that the state has retained 
many of its prerogatives in the process. A sociologist hired as advisor to the minister of 
Defense for the “civilianization” of the checkpoints told me, “Administratively speaking, it is 
not privatization. (…) Privatization means delegating state responsibilities to private actors. 
The answer is absolutely not; sovereignty in this case is clear.”14 This definition of privatization 
can be qualified, and the claim that state responsibility has not been delegated in this case 
can even be refuted. The fact remains that this argument, frequently advanced by the various 
actors, should be taken seriously and analyzed, because it relates to the particular modes of 
this outsourcing process that aims to restructure the task of surveillance in such a way as to 
delegate the work while maintaining state responsibility.
12 See diagram of a checkpoint as it appears in an official tender for bids in appendix.
13 Hibou (ed.), 1999; Bayart, 2004; Thomson, 1994; Valcarce, 2011; Ollson, 2003.
14 Interview with L., Herzlyia, April 2010. Unless otherwise indicated, all interviews were conducted in Hebrew 
and translated in collaboration with the author.
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Administrative Modes of Outsourcing
The administrative approach to outsourcing checkpoint management involves two main 
procedures: the creation of a Crossing Directorate, and the subcontracting of security and 
inspection to private security service companies.
The decision to create the Crossing Directorate, an institution under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Defense, was proposed and passed by the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) at 
the same time as the decision regarding “civilianization,” in order to implement the reform 
and take over operation of the “civilianized” checkpoints. During one of the parliamentary 
committee discussions on the subject, Bezalel Traiber, head of the Crossing Directorate at the 
time, explained, “Companies will operate according to instructions issued by the Crossing 
Authority (…), under the Ministry of Defense. We will be the ones to control, regulate and 
closely supervise this system. Moveover, at the crossing points there will be a blend [tamhil] 
of people – civil servants, state officials, and police officers – depending on the required roles. 
(…) There are things that civilians cannot do and responsibilities that must be borne by the 
civil service and that will remain that way. State officials will continue to be present at crossing 
points.”15 Parliamentary committee discussions moreover dealt extensively with such questions 
of responsibility, mandate and distribution of roles between the military and police forces, state 
and private actors.16 Traiber also pointed out, “You can’t send in a civilian and tell him ‘go 
ahead, you have full mandate and you exercise a power of government.’ That won’t happen 
and it’s important to emphasize that.”17 The Authority’s official responsibility—and thus the 
state dimension of the new system—implies the presence of Authority employees to supervise 
and administer operation of the checkpoints. As a regulatory body, this institution took part in 
drafting the official tender and the specifications at the basis of Ministry of Defense contracts 
with private companies. These two documents outline companies responsibilities toward the 
Ministry and the reciprocal commitments of each party18—conditions which include limits on 
the power of the private companies, each of which can manage no more than two “blocks” 
(eshkol) of the checkpoints19—and very precise criteria regarding the training and skills of the 
employees (those occupying positions of high-level responsibility must be personally approved 
by the Ministry). Moreover, the Crossing Authority ensures continual presence of at least one 
state official at each of the checkpoints placed under its supervision who directly represents 
the state and who can delegate responsibilities to civilians. For the reasons explained above, 
this is however not currently the case in the East Jerusalem area checkpoints. The number of 
Crossing Authority officials has been reduced to a minimum (one or two in most checkpoints, 
six in the largest ones, such as Tarkumia, near Hebron), in keeping with a neoliberal tendency 
15 Protocol no. 495, 2005
16 Protocol no. 425, 2005; protocol no. 439, 2005; protocol no. 485, 2005; protocol no. 495, 2005.
17 Protocol no. 495, 2005.
18 Official tender for bids for the management of crossing points, non-confidential documents published by 
the state of Israel, Ministry of Defense, May 15, 2005.
19  This condition was removed, however, from the second tender launched in November 2008.
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to distrust the efficiency of state structures and those who embody them. The Authority itself 
moreover openly states this position.20 The process of “civilianization” of the checkpoints 
can thus be considered as an official transfer of the power of military officials to civilian state 
officials. In actual fact, it is more a question of subcontracting to partners in the private sphere 
while the state retains considerable control.
The second administrative aspect of this reform is the subcontracting of firms to perform 
security screening and surveillance at the checkpoints. These companies, chosen according to 
the bids they submitted, are “service providers.” Following the first invitation to tender issued 
in 2005, five companies were chosen. They provide various subcontracted services including, 
in addition to security and surveillance, cleaning and maintenance.21 As regards security tasks, 
they do fund transfers by armored truck, protect various sites (schools, hospitals, shopping and 
industrial centers, etc.), accompany hikes and school field trips, employ armed guards having 
various levels of training to protect goods and persons, do consulting and installation of electronic 
detection and surveillance systems. They actually amount to temporary employment agencies 
that supply manpower to private and public companies, but the fact that they are considered as 
“service providers” and not as manpower or temporary agencies enables them to skirt Israeli 
legislation which sets a nine-month limit on employment by a temporary agency in order to 
prevent this type of employment, by definition precarious, from becoming the norm.22 It thus 
turns out that in the framework of checkpoint management, the state has not merely adopted 
neoliberal strategies such as subcontracting, it has become one of the main actors in the spread 
of such practices, thus participating in the development of flexible and precarious jobs.23 
The inspectors and security guards employed by these private companies are thus hired with 
a one-year renewable contract. Their roles vary depending on the checkpoint. At those where 
“civilianization” is considered complete, such as Tarkumia, the inspectors handle nearly all 
interactions with the people who go through while armed guards are responsible for security. 
In the area of East Jerusalem, such as Kalandyia-Atarot, near Ramallah, it is soldiers or police 
officers who handle interaction with the people going through, while security there is also 
handled by private security guards. Amendments to the law on public order and security in 
2005 and 2007 broadened the authority of private security guards and inspectors stationed at 
checkpoints by granting them the right to request identification and produce permits as well 
as to inspect persons and their baggage on entering the crossing point.24 However, if other 
means of intervention are used, such as prohibiting crossing or body searches, the presence 
20 A manager for Mikud Security recounted Bezalel Traiber’s comment on the subject: “Civil servants are like 
nails without a head. They go in, and then you can’t get them out” (interview with E., Tel-Aviv, January 2007).
21 Following the second invitation to tender in 2008, only two companies were chosen and it is these two 
companies today that handle security screening and surveillance at all of the checkpoints.
22 Paz-Fuchs and Kohavi, 2010: 35.
23 For a theoretical analysis of the role of the state and senior civil servants in diffusing the methods of a market 
society, see Polanyi, 1983 (1944); and for a more contemporary context, Dardot and Laval 2009. In Israel, between 
2006 and 2010, 400 contracts were signed between public bodies and service providers for a total amount of 
120 million NIS (New Israeli Shekel, or 24 million euros) per month. Paz-Fuchs and Kohavi, 2010.
24 Military decree no. 1665, 2010.
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of a state Crossing Authority employee or a member of the state security forces (military or 
police) is mandatory.
Lastly, it should be noted that alongside Crossing Authority and private contractor employees, 
many other actors representing the state security forces are present at checkpoints. The police 
and the General Security Service (GSS) have been designated as “advisory institutions” for 
security issues and in this capacity participate in defining and drafting security regulations, 
setting up inspection procedures and even making decisions regarding facility layout and 
equipment. Some managerial tasks, especially issuance and confiscation of crossing permits, 
come under the sole authority of the military unit, the District Coordination Office (DCO).25 
The list of offices and areas as it appears in the tender reveals the complexity of the network of 
agencies that take part in managing these places. The list includes several military and police 
units but also state agencies such as customs and the Ministry of Agriculture. This explains 
why I am reluctant to analyze the new checkpoints management in terms of privatization. It 
is more appropriate to speak of an outsourcing process which, although it certainly involves 
private actors, also and above all involves administrative reorganization and a different use of 
state agents.
New Modes of Governing
Analysis of the practical administrative and institutional details of this evolution shows that 
the state plays a central role in setting up and managing this new system. The decision-making 
process has been largely influenced by state actors: the reform was initiated following the State 
Comptroller’s report in 200326 on the outsourcing of several military missions. Before being 
approved by the Knesset, the report was discussed extensively in parliamentary committees. 
For this reason I find it more relevant to start by examining the concrete modes of governing 
checkpoints to achieve a description of sovereignty as it appears through this reform, rather 
than discussing sovereignty as an abstract concept.
Categories blurred by continuities 
The links between state actors, private security contractors, and the official military and 
security apparatus are very entwined. In this sphere of activity, the large majority of actors 
come from the military and are often linked through networks of acquaintance. All checkpoint 
managers hired by the Ministry of Defense must have “relevant experience,” and are thus all from 
25 The DCO (matak) was created with the aim to take over certain responsibilities of the Civil Administration 
after the Oslo Accords, especially issuance of permits to enter Israel, circulation permits, and work permits. Since 
the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the failure of peace negotiations, this office is once again 
managed solely by the Civil Administration.
26 Mevaker hamevina (literally “control of the state”) is an Israeli state institution founded in 1949. Its main 
functions involve examining the activities of government institutions and civil servants, from the exercise of authority 
down to the use of public funds, to verify that they are carried out in accordance with the law and set standards, 
and submit a report to induce improvement in the functioning of government administrations and institutions.
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the official security forces—the army, the GSS, or the police. Traiber, for instance, has a long 
military career behind him. A former member of a special forces team in charge of preventing 
the infiltration of enemy forces in Israeli territory, today he is an army reserve duty colonel. 
Current Crossings Administrator Kamil Abu Rukun is an army reserve brigadier general. His 
military career involved heading the military office of the Civil Administration in the Occupied 
Territories. Private security team leaders are also often former military officers. One of them 
told me he had completed his military service in a special forces unit known as “Duvdevan,” 
an elite unit in charge of “sensitive missions” in the Occupied Territories.27 The recruitment 
criteria for inspectors and security officers stipulate completion of compulsory military service, 
and to be hired as an armed guard, the candidate must have combat experience.28 Furthermore, 
many of the managerial staff hired to operate the checkpoints have already done this type of 
work during their military service. This is moreover the profile desired by all of the actors: the 
Ministry of Defense, private contractors, and even the army. The head of a team of inspectors 
for Mikud at the Sha’ar Efrayim checkpoint described the ideal employee for me in these terms: 
“The manager should be someone who finished his military service a month before, lives near 
the crossing point and is willing to work for two years (…) for instance to pay for his studies or 
take a trip.”29 The military also takes part in setting up these career bridges. One soldier in the 
inspector unit of the military police for instance told me that her unit had hosted representatives 
from a private security firm who came to talk to the soldiers about career opportunities in 
the field.30 As many authors have already pointed out in others contexts,31 continuity on a 
career path and the close links between private contractors and the state military and security 
apparatus blur the distinction between state civil, military, and private actors. In fact, this 
confusion has to do with the fact that service in the military is very often followed by service 
in the state civil apparatus or the private sector for one and the same person. Analysis of the 
modes of governing is thus characterized by the difficulty of distinguishing between the state 
sphere and that of “civil society,” both very close to the military apparatus.
Diffusion, dispersion, and dilution of responsibility
Although the Crossing Authority aims to centralize authorities,32 its creation has in fact 
added an additional institution to the already complex web of state agencies in charge of 
these places. The Crossing Authority works with the DCO, the Civil Administration, the 
Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the army, the police, and the border 
police (Magav). According to journalist Haim Levinson, nine different agencies have a hand in 
27 Interview with E., cited.
28 Official tender for bids, cited; protocol no. 485, 2005.
29 Interview with E., cited.
30 Interview, Te’enim-Jubra checkpoint, April 2010.
31 Valcarce, 2011; Hibou (ed.), 1999; Ollson, 2003; Bricet Des Vallons, 2009.
32 Annual State Comptroller’s Report, 2003.
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border checkpoint management.33 The number of actors and the complexity of the network 
leads to juxtapositions that produces chaos. What Traiber referred to as a blend has been 
called a “mess” (blil) by the police officer who is officially responsible for five checkpoints in 
East Jerusalem,34 a term that better evokes the inherent confusion of the setup. In this area, 
security guards, police officers, and soldiers work side by side in a distribution of roles that 
is not always clear. A police officer who worked in these checkpoints explained in a press 
interview, “Every day you got to the checkpoint and there were other forces there. Sometimes, 
when they hadn’t hired enough civilian inspectors, they brought in soldiers from the military 
police or border police officers, and it was confusing. (…) Everyone did what he wanted to. 
We patrolled in front of the checkpoint, then, all of a sudden, someone decided to check the 
IDs of everyone going by. Then, suddenly, they’d decide to let everyone through.”35 Although 
the state officially retains responsibility at these sites, the multitude of state civil and military 
bodies as well as private actors involved in operating the checkpoints tends to dilute actual 
responsibility. I observed the consequences of this dispersion of power when the head of the 
Tarkumia checkpoint told me that none of the checkpoint management problems raised by 
Machsom Watch36 activists fell under his responsibility. His employees did confiscate permits 
of a dozen Palestinians who had been working in Israel for over 15 years, but they were simply 
following instructions given to them via the computer system. The checkpoint manager also 
agreed that the activists’ criticisms regarding the very poor state of repair of the equipment in 
the Palestinian waiting area was justified, but explained that this area did not come under his 
responsibility. Since it was located on the “Palestinian” side of the checkpoint, the Crossing 
Authority could do nothing about it: “I tried everything, I called everyone on the phone, the 
Civil Administration, the Ministry of Defense, even USAID. But the other side of the checkpoint 
is considered Area C [according to the Oslo Accords], and my authority stops there [pointing 
to the “Israeli” side of the checkpoint]. On the Israeli side, you can see that everything is well 
maintained.”37 This last example is eloquent: it shows to what extent the multitude of agencies 
in charge and the ambiguous legal and political status of these pseudo-border spaces that do 
not actually separate two sovereign entities contributes to the fragmentation and dilution of 
responsibility.
An Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) official exposed to me the 
difficulties and inefficiencies that involving a new authority at the checkpoints was likely to 
entail: “Before the privatization we already had to deal with two different institutions that 
controlled the Occupied Territories and the movement of Palestinians—the army and the 
Civil Administration. Now they’ve added a third one, which has overlapping responsibilities, 
and this might complicate things even more. When different institutions share responsibilities 
33 Levinson, 2010.
34 Interview with D., Kalandyia, April 2010.
35 Levinson, 2010.
36 Machsom Watch (“Checkpoints watch”). This organization is formed by Israeli women who station themselves 
every day at dozens of checkpoints in the West Bank to observe soldiers’ behavior, record human rights violations, 
and intervene whenever possible.
37 Interview with S., Tarkumia checkpoint, April 2010.
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for the same things, it becomes easier for each of them to blame the other and to avoid any 
responsibility by saying: ‘It’s not me, it’s him.’”38
Sociologist Nir Gazit speaks of “fragmented sovereignty” to describe situations of protracted 
military involvement in a civilian environment beyond national borders,39 not only at military 
checkpoints between the state of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, but also in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. He argues that this particular form of sovereignty is characterized by the 
delegation of power to ground-level agents,40 in this case simple soldiers. The strategy enables 
the state to be at once “present” and “absent” in a territory suffering from a legal and political 
structural ambiguity that arises from a situation of “extended temporary” military occupation. 
The reform of checkpoint operation and the creation of the Crossing Authority have been 
designed with the aim to “recenter” power and state authority. At the same time, however, a 
decentralization process has taken place, as the devolution of power to the Crossing Authority 
has not been to the exclusion of other agencies involved in checkpoint management, nor has 
it been accompanied by a recognized and accepted political and legal status for these places. 
The effort to centralize power and reorganize the distribution of tasks thus appears to fall in 
more with a logic of continuation than of change in practices: the disorder and arbitrariness 
that characterized the operation of military checkpoints41 have been partly heightened by an 
increasingly complex web of institutions that share managerial responsibility for these places.
Formalizing the inspection procedure and reducing operators’ margin for maneuver 
Even if the reorganization and centralization of policy decisions via the creation of a new 
state agency have been hindered by complex network web of agencies involved simultaneously 
on the same premises, the restructuring and formalization of inspection procedures has led 
to an internal reorganization of the distribution of tasks and authority within the new system.
Soldiers and police offices, can legitimately use force (as long as there is no abuse of power) 
since they represent state security forces. Delegation of authority is more delicate as regards 
private security firm employees, however. Their contracts specify limitations on their authority 
and strictly outline their tasks and procedures. This aspect was discussed at length during 
parliamentary committees on the reform, and the importance of placing limits on the power 
delegated to private inspectors was highlighted.42 The formalization and regulation of procedures 
aiming to reduce the employees’ margin for maneuver introduces a radical change with respect 
to military practices. According to Gazit, a significant feature of the system of occupation is 
38 Interview, Jerusalem, April 2010. 
39 Gazit, 2010.
40 Gazit uses this term to refer to employees low on a given hierarchy, further to his reading of Migdal, 1994, 
and Lipsky, 1980.
41 Gazit, 2010; Havkin, 2008; Handel, 2007; Machsom Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 2004.
42 Protocol no. 425, 2005; protocol no. 439, 2005; protocol no. 485, 2005; protocol no. 495, 2005.
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precisely a lack of formal regulation. It is thus characterized by the microdecisions made by 
non-commissioned officers.43
In a study devoted to the military power strategies of the occupation, Ariel Handel points out 
this same phenomenon: “In most cases of friction between the military forces and Palestinian 
civilians, power is delegated to the simple NCO in charge of the checkpoint, while decisions 
made by high-ranking officers have virtually no effect on what happens on the ground.”44 A 
soldier’s aptitude to make independent decisions is illustrated by the military expression rosh 
gadol (literally “big head” or broad thinking), which denotes an ability to act on the basis of an 
overall perspective and an analysis of the situation at hand rather than to settle for automatically 
following orders. This ability is considered in military circles to be a quality. 
Unlike soldiers, private operators are not supposed to have an overall perspective or make 
individual decisions and are on the contrary sanctioned when they do not follow procedures 
to the letter. The formalization of the inspection procedure and reduction of these employees’ 
margin for maneuver sometimes results in preposterous situations. A former security guard 
thus told me that he was punished for not having obeyed the procedure to arrest a suspected 
person when a Palestinian carrying a traditional dagger arrived at the checkpoint: “I knew 
that no one would stage an attack on a checkpoint with a shabaria [traditional dagger], all the 
more since it was in the travel bag that he put through the scanner. It just wasn’t logical. (…) 
Security guards have to act according to formal procedures, but a good security guard is a 
guard who uses his head, who looks around and who makes decisions.”45 This is a perfectly 
ordinary example of a bureaucratic institution in which employees are supposed to follow 
formal procedures, for instance in airports and other ordinary border crossing points. In the 
case of Israeli checkpoints, it reflects a radical transformation not only in the way of running 
such places, but also in the ethos that presides over their management. Devolution to private 
agents has been accompanied with a reduction in the authority of ground-level agents and a 
centralization of inspection procedure decision-making power in the hands of senior officials at 
the Ministry of Defense and the “advisory institutions”—the police and the GSS—, considered 
to be “security professionals.” This change, which establishes a distinction between application 
of the procedure and responsibility for this procedure, results in removing responsibility from 
operators who feel they do not have to account personally for their acts. Outsourcing thus 
moves in two directions: devolution of tasks to the private sphere that until now had fallen 
to the state and, at the same time, the restructuring of authority and the formalization of 
procedures that enable the state not only to maintain but also to reinforce its control over the 
system through its agents. 
Another aspect that flows from curtailing private operators’ ability to intervene and their 
margin of autonomy is the restriction of direct inspector and security guard contact with the 
population going through the checkpoints, thus precluding any opportunity for dialogue and 
negotiation. An OCHA official explained to me that new checkpoint rules put them in unforeseen 
43 Gazit, 2010.
44 Handel, 2007: 110.
45 Interview with A., Beer-Tuvia, April 2010.
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problematic situations: UN regulations outline the inspection procedures that its employees can 
be subjected to and those to which they are not allowed to submit. They for instance are not 
allowed to get out of their vehicle for a security check. Now, in the new checkpoints, operators 
require UN employees to submit to the same procedure as the Palestinians: “With the soldiers 
we could negotiate, you could talk your way through. (...) It’s not the case with the private 
companies, they have formal regulations, it’s black or white and once they tell you no, it’s no.”46
However, the reduction of direct contact mainly affects interactions with Palestinian men 
and women. The electronic turnstiles, loudspeakers, surveillance cameras, scanners, and 
digital fingerprinting devices making up the technological platform are all instruments for 
carrying out remote inspection that reduce the space for negotiation between the occupying 
force and the occupied population in situations that are often tense and violent. Wherever 
possible, operators have been replaced by machines that carry out inspection with no human 
intervention.47 In Gazit’s analysis, the lack of formal regulations at the military checkpoints 
allowed direct interaction between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians.48 However, the 
reorganization implemented by the reform and the ensuing reduction in human intervention 
have “installed” the decision-making space in the offices of “security professionals,” moving it 
even further from the Palestinians subjected to the system. Combined with the strict regulation 
of movement through the checkpoints as well as remote inspection technologies, this alienation 
is not a pacification of the system but instead an institutionalization of the confrontation. The 
law, or here the formalization of a regulation, is not the end of a war but its continuation by 
other means in that, to use Michel Foucault’s expression, it is born of battles and sustains one 
side’s victory through the other side’s submission.49 The reduction of human intervention and 
direct contact fundamentally transforms the modes of domination. The technological platform 
thus reinforces the unilateral nature of interactions: loudspeakers enable operators to give 
orders but not to hear reactions or requests for explanation.50 Although the aim is indeed to 
reduce friction that can be the source of an outbreak of tension, the means used are no longer 
negotiation and interaction but the reduction of direct contact to the greatest extent possible 
and the adoption of alienation strategies.51
46 Interview, cited.
47 This technological “utopia” appears in the description of Comsec’s CEO who developed a biometric 
identification system to be used at the checkpoints: “The Israeli biometric terminal will be the largest in the world. 
The system will enable the rapid daily crossing of 45,000 persons without the border crossing being manned.” 
Marom, 1999. 
48 Gazit, 2010.
49 Foucault, 2003 [1997]: 50: “No matter what philosophico-juridical theory may say, political power does not 
begin when the war ends (…) right, peace and laws were born in the blood and mud of battles. (…) The law is not 
born of nature, and it was not born near the fountains that the first shepherds frequented: the law is born of real 
battles, victories, massacres, and conquests (…); the law was born in burning towns and ravaged fields”; Neil, 2004.
50 Handel, 2006.
51 See, among others, Andreas, 2000; Andreas and Snyder (eds), 2000; Makaremi and Kobelinsky (eds), 2008; 
Bigo (ed.), 2007.
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Outsourcing as abdication? 
The image of a “crack in state sovereignty” obviously does not appear relevant to describe 
the effects of outsourcing. The idea of “transfer” may prove more useful instead. This notion, 
discussed by Béatrice Hibou in her interpretation of Max Weber, can be used to describe the 
creation of a new form of governmentality and examine the areas in which outsourcing has 
led to transfers of responsibility via “ongoing processes of renegotiation between the ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ sphere and via processes of delegation and ex post control.”52
In an article entitled “Outsourcing Violations: The Israeli Case,” using the concept of outsourcing, 
Neve Gordon suggests that the devolution of tasks previously handled by state security forces 
to foreign forces or private partners leads to human rights violations.53 He in particular draws 
a parallel between the abdication of moral and social responsibility in the context of global 
capitalism—see the economic strategies of multinational corporations as regards working 
conditions—and the abdication of political responsibility by the state as regards the preservation 
of human rights. I am not interested here in the moral dimension transferring state responsibility 
for safeguarding human rights, as it seems to me too abstract, formal, and normative; I would 
instead like to mention other instances of transfer entailed by such outsourcing.
Outsourcing constitutes a highly “economical” mode of organization, as the Crossing Authority 
solely assumes overall responsibility for checkpoint management whereas private contractors 
and their employees assume the actual responsibility for the work carried out as well as the 
risks that this work is likely to entail. Risk should be envisaged here in both its symbolic and 
material dimensions. From a symbolic standpoint, outsourcing offers a way of transferring 
danger onto individuals who do not “represent” the nation and whose lives do not belong to 
the highly symbolic collective sphere to which soldiers belong, as they are considered as the 
nation’s “best sons” (tovei baneinu).54 From a material standpoint, this transfer of risk, in the 
event of disability, even death, enables the state, which has a particularly generous regime of 
allowances and compensation, to transfer its financial responsibility to the security firms whose 
obligations toward their employees are considerably lesser.
Legal responsibility is also outsourced: since private contractors do not have internal legal 
departments, unlike the army or the police, in the event a complaint is filed against their security 
guards and inspectors, they are tried as individuals in the framework of a criminal court.55 
The consequences of this juridical transfer, which easily exceeds the case of Israel,56 are also 
political, as such violations then appear as individual cases of criminality instead of being seen 
as the structural outcome of checkpoint management and restrictions on the movement of 
persons and goods in the context of occupation.
52 Hibou (ed.), 1999: 35.
53 Gordon, 2002.
54 See the findings of the Winograd Commission, which dispute the fact that the first rule of combat during 
the Lebanon War was not to endanger soldiers’ lives (Final Report of the Winograd Commission of Inquiry into 
the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006, January 2008). See also Levy, 2009.
55 Breiner, 2009; protocol no. 485, 2005; protocol no. 495, 2005; protocol no. 425, 2005.
56 Senor and Singer, 2003; Ollson, 2003; Schreier and Caparini, 2005.
Les Etudes du CERI ­ n° 174 bis ­ Shira Havkin ­ May 2011 17
Lastly, this transfer process also concerns the state’s responsibility as employer. Subcontracting 
and maintaining a lower number of civil servants and permanent staff should be included 
among the major effects of outsourcing strategy. This again indicates a mode of redeploying 
the role of the state when it abdicates responsibility for working conditions and relations while 
maintaining control over the employees. The tender to operate crossing points states that the 
company will offer the Ministry of Defense compensation in the event that an employee makes 
demands on it as employer. However, in the event that an employee contract is terminated 
by the Crossing Authority, the company must replace the employee at its own expense.57 It 
sometimes happens that an employee who has been fired is unable to find out which institution 
is responsible for the termination of his contract. This was the case of a Mikud employee fired 
in 2008 following a labor conflict involving failure to respect employee rights: the contractor 
informed him that the Crossing Authority had requested his dismissal while insisting on the fact 
that it owed him no explanation as it was not his employer:58 “It’s a paradise of control with 
no responsibility. All responsibility rests with the contracting party,” summed up Eran Golan, 
the lawyer who represented the company’s employees in this labor conflict.59
I would like, however, to point out I am in no way claiming that these various aspects are 
the designated goals of outsourcing or the rationale behind it. My point here is not to say the 
checkpoints were outsourced in order to abdicate responsibility for certain tasks, but only to 
study the structural effects of this reform.
Is the Deregulation Caused by Outsourcing Unavoidable?
The last aspect I would like to deal with here is the role of the state as regulator in the 
civilianized checkpoints. The parliamentary committee protocols on the subject reveal that 
state structures ensure rigorous regulation and control over security inspection procedures, 
training and hiring conditions of the employees and on the checkpoint operating process. Such 
rigor is an exception to the rule by which outsourcing and subcontracting processes usually 
lead to deregulation. Will this exception be maintained in the medium to long term? Should 
gradual deregulation not be expected, which in particular would be reflected in less and less 
detail, from one tender to the next, of hiring criteria and employment conditions or a gradual 
alleviation of the stringency of control? It is doubtless too early to answer this question, but 
the control posts located at the entrance to industrial parks60 in the Occupied Territories and 
which are geographically very close to border checkpoints, can serve as a point of comparison.
These control posts are often also managed by private security firms, sometimes the very 
same ones that manage the border checkpoints. However, unlike the latter, their operation 
57 Official tender for bids, cited.
58 Sinai, 2008.
59 Interview with Eran Golan, Tel-Aviv, October 2011.
60 These industrial parks are managed by Israeli companies which enjoy certain financial advantages such as tax 
incentives, low labor inspection levels, and cheap labor. See Alenat and Amar, 2008; Corcos, 2007; Bahour, 2010.
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does not come under the purview of the Crossing Authority and their direct clients are the 
companies operating in the industrial park. State agency regulation is much lower there. 
Interviews I conducted with employees at these control posts revealed to me a much different 
situation from that of their counterparts at border checkpoints. First of all, worker supervision 
at such places is much less regulated and less strict: a security guard at the Atarot industrial 
park told me he was given only three days of training (training for border checkpoint security 
guards lasts 21 days). The pay scale is also very different: several guards in these areas told me 
they made minimum wage (i.e. 21 NIS or 4.2 euros per hour, whereas a border checkpoint 
security guard sometimes earns twice that). One of them told me he had been hired on a 
three-month renewable fixed-term contract, whereas border checkpoint security guard and 
inspector contracts are for one year renewable. According to my observations and interviews, 
the age of some guards at these control posts seems much higher (around 50) than those of 
the border checkpoint security guards, who are rarely over 30. Another fact to point out is that 
a large majority of the security guards I met in the industrial parks are Palestinian citizens of 
the state of Israel. A security guard at the Nizaney Shalom industrial park explained why: “At 
night, the security guard remains here all alone. No Israeli [Jew] would agree to remain here 
at any price.” In answer to my questions about the risk run, the security guards told me about 
the attack perpetrated at this control post in 2008. In a press interview, an officer explained, 
“There are supposed to be three security guards, but if one runs away as soon as he hears 
shots fired and another forgets his weapon, it’s obvious that such an event ends with tragic 
consequences.”61 This information clearly indicates that in places where operation of control 
posts has been delegated to the private sector with no state regulation, supervision is much 
less strict, working conditions are more unstable and more dangerous, and salaries lower. This 
is one of the most widespread consequences of subcontracting.
However, even though this comparison is only partially relevant state oversight and regulation 
of some aspects of checkpoint management may gradually diminish. Two of the security guards 
I interviewed told me that the wages their company paid them had decreased after its contract 
with the Ministry of Defense was renewed. Given that one of the primary means for the state 
to guarantee highly skilled labor has to do with it imposing a lower ceiling on the wages paid 
by the subcontracting companies, such a change understandably means a decrease in state 
regulation. Nevertheless, the fact that the initiative for the reform comes from a desire to enhance 
the national and international image of the border checkpoints and an effort on the part of the 
state of Israel to reorganize their operations in keeping with “good management” practices 
must be taken into account. Unlike the industrial park control posts, the border checkpoints 
are supposed to look like terminals, “elsewhere in the world” and are viewed (and designed) as 
spaces in which security screening is capital for national defense. Likewise, as devices located 
at the interface between the Israeli and Palestinian societies, the national and international 
political significance of their “good management” largely exceeds that of the management of 
the neighboring industrial park control posts. The importance of these issues is likely to limit 
the deregulation process and explains why outsourcing goes together with a strengthening of 
state power over the operating modes of these places.
61 Breiner, 2009.
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RESTRUCTURING THE MARKETS: TURNING SECURITY INTO A COMMODITY
The commodification of security, like security outsourcing, is often analyzed according to 
a binary logic that sets the state and its domestic policy—security being considered a public 
good—against market forces. The authors who take this perspective envisage the security 
market as a military-industrial complex, the actors of which convert the economic power they 
accumulate via arms sales into political influence to support their interests, a process that is 
an impediment to democracy.62 Challenging this approach, I will demonstrate the connections 
between the state and the market, showing how the outsourcing of checkpoint management 
contributes toward making security a “product” and helps develop a market in this field which, 
first, is closely linked to the state and second, has grown out of the specific characteristics of 
the Israeli society and economy.
Evolution of the Role of Security in the Israeli Economy
To better understand the evolution of security into a commodity and the development of 
the security services market, a brief survey of the history of security in Israel is first in order.
For the young state of Israel and up until the late 1960s, security was at once an end and a 
means to unite the people and build a nation.63 During this period, the definition of security 
was thus broadened to cover a wide variety of projects. In 1955, Ben Gurion declared that 
security held a more important place in Israel than in other countries, that “security meant 
settling and peopling the ‘empty areas,’ the dispersal of the population and establishment of 
industries throughout the country, the development of agriculture. (…) Security is economic 
independence, it means fostering research and scientific ability.”64 After the war of 1967, and 
to face the threat of an international embargo, public security spending rose constantly.65 In the 
second half of the 1970s, it reached 40 % of the national budget and nearly 30 % of GDP.66 
This trend slackened in the 1980s after the peace treaty was signed with Egypt (1980) and a 
neoliberal reform and “economic stabilization” program was adopted (1985),67 but especially 
because the size of military spending, although justified and legitimated by a discourse 
underscoring the security threat facing the state,68 was challenged by calls for a reduction in 
public spending and the imposition of budget discipline. The 1990s were marked by the hope 
62 Pery and Noybach, 1996; Kleimann, 1996.
63 Ben Eliezer, 1998.
64 David Ben Gurion, speech before the Knesset, November 7, 1955, cited by Ben-Eliezer, 1995: 276.
65 Swirski, 2005.
66 Gronau, 2002.
67 Swirski, 2005; Meman and Rozenhek, 2009.
68 Bichler and Nitzan, 2001.
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of a conciliation between national policy and neoliberal economic rationality, and this in a 
perspective of “normalization” of Israeli politics by the peace accords and integration into the 
world economy. However, the theory defended by some Israeli scholars69 according to whom 
espousal of neoliberal methods and reduction in public spending, including military spending, 
would go hand in hand with the pacification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and would lay 
the groundwork for a new economic prosperity, soon fizzled out. The outbreak of the second 
Intifada in October 2000 and the period of extreme violence following it suddenly brought to 
an end the dream shared by the Israeli left and the business elite (often made up of the same 
people)70 of a “new Middle East,” to use Shimon Peres’ expression. Since the year 2000, the 
perspective of political normalization has vanished and the challenge to both economists and 
politicians has boiled down to ensuring the conditions conducive to economic prosperity in 
the framework of constraints imposed by large-scale military spending.
The security and defense sector is the largest in the Israeli economy. For every 1,000 Israeli 
citizens, 33.4 are military (compared to an average of 6.2 in so-called developed countries).71 
Nearly 25 % of the employees in Israeli industry work directly or indirectly for the security 
sector.72 Security spending for the year 2009 was estimated at 60 billion NIS, or 8.1 % of 
GDP.73 Subtracting the aid supplied by the United States government for weapons and defense, 
military spending can be estimated at 6.7 % of GDP,74 an extremely high figure compared to 
the military spending of other industrialized countries such as the United States (4.6 % of GDP 
in 2007) and France (2 % in 2007).75
The question for Israeli economists and politicians is then to figure out how to combine a 
neoliberal economic model conducive to prosperity and economic stability with exceptional 
military spending that is likely to grow further. Some have opted for a discursive strategy that 
minimizes the effects of this “anomaly” on the Israeli economy76 while altering the terms of 
the debate.
In fact, since the second half of the 1990s and especially since the 2000s, a discourse has 
proliferated that, contrary to the classic model in which security expenditures are considered 
as public spending, considers this spending as a direct or indirect “investment” in the national 
economy. Thus, some economic and political actors have constantly underlined the positive 
effects of national “investment” in the security industry on the economy. During a conference 
69 Shafir and Peled (eds), 2000; Shalev, 2004.
70 Peled, 1995; Ben Porat, 2004.
71 Gronau, 2002: 70.
72 Horowitz and Lisk, 1996: 99.
73 These estimates are based on Ministry of Finance calculations. The compilation of figures is in fact a major 
political issue and divergences between the various data published give proof of this. Other estimates calculated 
on the basis of information supplied by the Central Bureau of Statistics do not include the police budget or aid to 
families of soldiers killed in active duty and estimate spending at 49.5 billion NIS, or 6.5 % of GDP. Even, 2010; 
Basok, 2010.
74 Report by the Committee on the Defense Budget, 2007: 51.
75 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
76 Hever, 2010.
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held in 2002, Defense minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer stated, “Security creates a positive 
dividend as this expenditure stimulates the security industry, contributes to employment in this 
sector and encourages high-tech industrial projects in the private sector.”77 The assumption 
that this form of state intervention—job creation and direct investment in private companies 
offering security products—is beneficial to the national economy is never challenged. It is 
moreover often expressed by authors who also support a neoliberal doctrine of reducing state 
intervention.78 This is a paradox only on the surface because the fact that such intervention is 
designed to reinforce security legitimates state interventionism as well as the public financing 
granted to actors on the private market. Thus, the authors of the policy paper for the Tenth 
Annual Economic Conference organized by the Israeli Democracy Institute think tank suggested 
formalizing a triangular link between security spending, the level of security and GDP, so as to 
calculate the return on security investment by factoring in the reduction of insecurity. Here is 
a case of integrating into the sphere of the market economy a sphere that until now had been 
analyzed in terms of engagement, urgency, and a “nation in arms.”
Although the high level of security expenditure has long been justified by arguments 
invoking the moral and social value of the collective engagement in national security, today, 
and particularly since the breakdown of peace negotiations, a new economic discourse has 
emerged that is no longer limited to justifying the importance, the rationality, or the need for 
security spending. Public security spending is henceforth considered as a public investment. 
And from the moment this investment is viewed as a means of regulating an economy of risk 
management striving for a happy medium, one that allows a minimum of security investment for 
a maximum of security, there is a convergence between security discourse and the neoliberal 
economic discourse.79
The (Partial) Commodification of Security in Outsourced Checkpoints
The term commodification supposes the existence of a group of buyers and a group of 
sellers of something that is henceforth considered as a commodity. According to Polanyi, one 
of the characteristics of the historic shift toward a market society involves turning all sorts of 
things into commodities, including those that have not been produced for sale on a market. 
Among these “fictitious commodities” Polanyi includes labor, land, and money, each of which 
play a basic role in society. One of the subtleties of Polanyi’s analysis is to point out that the 
commodification of these things does not lie solely in the fact of identifying them as full-fledged 
commodities but in the dialectic movement between this inclusionary effort and political 
initiatives to defend their original functions, a movement in which the state plays a central 
77 Gronau, 2002: 57.
78 Gronau, 2002; Nevo and Shur-Shmueli, 2004; Keret, 2003.
79 Yagil Levy suggests a historic analysis of the tension between market and militarism in Israel and the evolution 
of what he calls a “market army”: until the 1980s, the army was considered as “superior” to the market; since the 
second half of the 1980s, it has been subject to the law of the market. Levy, 2010. 
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role.80 This description of the commodification process is entirely relevant to the present study, 
because outsourcing control over the border checkpoints involves a partial commodification 
in which the state is a major actor. Contrary to most private and public establishments in 
Israel—shopping centers, restaurants, movie theaters, schools, museums, etc.81—, private 
security contractors that manage checkpoints do not sell a share of security to the direct users 
of their services, but to the Ministry of Defense. This is thus a commodification that affects 
only part of the exchange, the supply side—offered by the sellers of security services—, but 
not demand. It is difficult to assess the volume of the new security product market, since the 
costs of outsourcing have not really been calculated or published. Government data in this 
area are often considered confidential. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense method of budget 
calculation, often criticized for its opacity and lack of precision, regularly underestimates real 
costs by presenting a fairly low official budget that omits certain items.82 Thus, in the proposed 
Defense budget presented and passed for the year 2008, the annual budget granted by the 
Ministry for managing outsourced checkpoints in the “seam zone” was 145 million NIS (29 
million euros). A much higher figure appeared one year later in a weekly IDF periodical that 
indicated the annual budget of the Crossing Authority as 200 million NIS (40 million euros) 
and that this sum would amount to 270 million NIS (54 million euros) once the outsourcing of 
all the checkpoints concerned was complete.83 This estimate, between 200 and 270 million 
NIS, an amount from which day-to-day operating expenses of the Crossing Authority must be 
subtracted as well as the salaries of its few dozen civil servants, is the most reliable estimate I 
have found for the dimension of this new market of security services.84
These figures thus mean that even if outsourcing encourages the development of a private 
market to provide security services, the demand for security products resists commodification 
in this context. Outsourcing as it has been practiced does not replace the state as primary 
security manager and does not alter the function of security as a public good.
There is nevertheless a competing program for outsourcing, which involves managing 
these checkpoints along a “closed market” model, i.e. by funding them via fees levied on the 
Palestinians and Israeli businesspeople who use them. This program was suggested by the Israel/
Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) in 1997, then again after the outbreak of 
the second Intifada in 2001. According to the Center’s founder, Gershon Baskin, the rationality 
behind this proposal is the idea that directly remunerating checkpoint managers would establish 
a link between the volume of traffic and the amount of the company’s profits, and that would 
prompt the companies to increase circulation: “The idea was to subject the system of passage 
80 Polanyi, 2001 (1944): 71-80.
81 The number of guards and security guards in Israel was estimated at 465,000 in 2003. Hendels, 2003.
82 Report by the Committee on the Defense Budget, 2007.
83 Tal, 2009.
84 This sum concerns only the market of security services. The construction of new checkpoints as well as the 
setting up of a technological platform have also contributed to the creation of new private markets in these areas. 
The only available evaluation of the cost of the construction and fitting out of five central “terminals” amounted to 
600 million NIS (calculated by the Knesset Research and Information Center in 2002, Annual State Comptroller’s 
Report, 2003: 77). I have no data regarding the cost of the technological platform installed.
Les Etudes du CERI ­ n° 174 bis ­ Shira Havkin ­ May 2011 23
to economic principles by setting up a system based on efficiency.”85 This program never came 
to fruition, but a military decree in November 2010 regarding the authority of the various 
agents in managing the “crossings” indicates that a fee for using the checkpoint infrastructure 
to transfer goods as well as a fee for crossing permits might be introduced86: “The project has 
been suspended, but not cancelled. We have been told that for the moment the security issue 
is a priority. When that changes, I believe our program will be reexamined. When I visited the 
Sha’ar Efrayim crossing, I saw that even if it wasn’t applied, the list of expenses was posted on 
the wall.”87 This program, which may be on the horizon for these places, raises questions as to 
the commodification process and the nature of this “fictitious commodity.” Since in the case 
of outsourced checkpoints, “border” control can hardly constitute a group of buyers except 
in the guise of the state, the commodification suggested by the IPCRI program transforms the 
definition of the product for sale, which in this case is no longer security but the act of crossing 
from one side to the other. 
The commodification of security at the outsourced checkpoints is further manifested in a 
more concrete fashion by the expansion of the private market of security providers. A wide 
range of companies that can enter into competition constitute the supply side. The tender issued 
by the Ministry of Defense defines the rules, the criteria, and conditions of this competition, 
which theoretically should be regulated by the market’s “invisible hand.” The criteria open 
to competition are the price of the service, professionalism, experience, responsibility, and 
accountability. In practice, as is often the case, there are considerable departures from the 
rule of the invisible hand. In 2003, the tender for bids to operate the Alenby crossing, won 
by security contractor Sheleg Lavan, was invalidated due to suspected manipulation,88 which 
did not prevent this company from winning the tender for checkpoints located in the south of 
the West Bank and the entrance to the Gaza Strip two years later. In 2009, a Mikud employee 
was also suspected of falsifying documents submitted for the tender.89 In fact, the combination 
between large contracts (the tender won by Sheleg Lavan was estimated at 230 million NIS, or 
46 million euros), the closeness of ties between the political elite and the security elite, both 
of which are heavily involved in these places, and the opacity justified for reasons of security, 
foster all sorts of arrangements that hover on the brink of illegality. Competition is of course 
more or less free or manipulated. The fact nevertheless remains that the thousands of new 
private sector employees as well as contracts amounting to tens, even hundreds of millions 
of NIS are a major development and expansion of the private market for security providers. 
Thus, the staff of Modi’in Ezrahi, which won two tenders, has increased to over 6,000 today.90 
Analysis of the structure of these companies, which make up a growing segment of the 
Israeli economy today, the forms of labor and the hiring practices they generate as well as the 
85 Telephone interview with Gershon Baskin, April 2010.
86 Military decree no. 1665, 2010.
87 Telephone interview with G. Baskin, cited.
88 Kra, 2003; Case 1587/02, 2003.
89 Case 9995/08, 2009.
90 http://www.modiin-ezrachi.co.il
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personnel they employ, is essential to understanding the concrete workings of this security 
market and particularly its signification with regard to the reorganization of the links between 
state and market.
Hiring Methods of Private Contractors and the Paradoxes of Outsourcing
Private security contractors are supposed to supply skilled labor; that is the whole justification 
for outsourcing. As a management strategy, it should enable the army to concentrate on its 
“sphere of activity”—combat and training for combat—by delegating the sensitive and quasi-
policing task of managing checkpoints to civilian professionals, perceived as more competent 
than the young conscripts. Traiber himself was convinced of it: “I always believed it was not a 
task for soldiers. We need professional individuals to deal with the Palestinians. Civilian guards 
will receive a salary and therefore will have an interest in doing the job as well as possible.”91
The nature of these companies reveals a paradoxical image of professionalization. As temporary 
agencies, their “sphere of activity” is employment. However, they reduce the definition of 
employment to a minimum. Except for hiring per se, all the other components of employment 
—supervision, job, and physical training—are in turn outsourced in a subcontracting chain: 
“psycho-technical” tests administered by specialized centers, training by a private school working 
for the Airport Authority, additional days of training given by a specialized firm. The paradox 
of professionalization lies in the fact that the temporary agency as “professional employer” 
reduces to a minimum any employer/employee relations that involve responsibility and which 
can be politicized. This paradox is at the very heart of the function of these companies.
A similar paradox has to do with the legal and administrative responsibility of the employers. 
In 2009, three of the five companies mentioned were summoned for an audit set up by 
the commission in charge of issuing permits to the security companies suspected of having 
violated their employees’ rights.92 The accumulation of complaints in fact challenged these 
companies’ right to ply their trade. Although they finally managed to convince the commission 
that their employment methods complied with the law, this event reveals the particularity of 
professionalism in this context: being a “professional employer” does not necessarily mean 
complying with labor laws, but rather walking a tightrope of legality.
As Traiber suggested, the definition of professionalism rests on the structural constraint of 
employer/employee relations more than on training, expertise, or supervision. Salaries are 
presented as a means of control, regulation, and discipline, in other words of subjection, that is 
much more effective than military discipline, even when reduced to the legal minimum. What 
the security guards and inspectors I interviewed told me—and especially what they did not 
tell me—confirmed the effectiveness of this constraint. Unlike soldiers, always willing to talk, 
employees of private contractors were far less cooperative and often answered my questions 
91 Greenberg, 2006.
92 Sharvit, 2009.
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with the official reply: “I can’t tell you anything. If you have questions, you can speak directly 
to the Crossing Authority.” They even refused to give me such routine information as the name 
of the company that had hired them. Since 2008, these employees must sign a legal document 
specifying 22 rules of confidentiality. An episode regarding this document shows how security 
arguments are used to hamper the transparence of employment conditions. During the previously 
mentioned labor conflict that broke out within Mikud in 2008, the union representative of the 
some dozens of employees involved was called in by the manager who asked him to sign a 
document forbidding him, among other things, from talking to the media. In this local version 
of Catch 22, the document was held to be so confidential that the employee (who had not yet 
signed it) did not even have the right to show it to his attorney. The fact that he had consulted 
a lawyer prompted an inquiry and, indirectly, his dismissal. The lawyer in question, Eran 
Golan, told me about the effort he went through to try to make this document public: “What’s 
wild is that the Ministry of Defense did not even have to ask that the document be declared 
confidential, the National Labor Court yielded to the security argument without even being 
asked. The security rhetoric was used to take revenge against one of the strike organizers.”93 
Control via labor relations is thus enhanced by the specific measures of the defense system that 
contributes to hampering individual rights (right to consult a lawyer, right to organize within 
a labor union, labor laws) in the name of security.94 The employees’ rights are in fact doubly 
infringed on: first by the subcontracting agencies, and second by the state institutions, such as 
the National Labor Court, which tend to bow down before security arguments in the name of 
preserving the collective good called security.
In the course of my interviews I also noted that the working conditions of inspectors and 
security guards varied from one company to another and often from one employee to another. 
This strategy of atomization and individualization is commonplace in this type of job,95 and 
has been found in other studies on temporary work. Pay for instance differs depending on 
the job category: whereas most inspectors hardly make more than minimum wage (23-26 
NIS per hour, or 4.6-5.2 euros), armed guards and supervisors are much better paid (34-55 
NIS per hour, or 6.8-11 euros). For both security guards and inspectors, working conditions 
are described as difficult and dangerous and they are under strict supervision. Furthermore, 
this sort of job often being a person’s first employment, the employee is more likely to be 
exploited. A former inspector told me she had filed a complaint against the company that 
hired her for having refused to pay her the money she was owed toward her retirement: 
“When I signed the contract, I was the one who didn’t know my rights, I’d just finished my 
military service, I knew what minimum wage was, but what was I to know about retirement 
schemes?! Later, I found out that others got more.”96 Some have criticized the unstable nature 
of their jobs. A security guard at the Tarkumia checkpoint was dismissed after having hesitated 
before accepting a transfer: “I was injured during a training session and when my sick leave 
93 Interview with E. Golan, cited.
94 For the situation in the United States, see Sassen, 2009 (2006): 147-154.
95 For France, see Jounin, 2008.
96 Interview with Y., Kiryat Gat, April 2010.
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ended, I was offered a position in Erez. I wasn’t thrilled at first, as Erez is a lot farther away. But 
afterward, I changed my mind, and then it was the Erez kabat [security officer] who didn’t want 
to take me. I was older, already 29, after the accident, which isn’t ideal for a security guard.”97 
Strategies of atomization, precarization, and maximal flexibility of the work force: working 
conditions for private security companies are finally fairly similar to those found in other sectors 
where subcontracting is common. However, in the case of checkpoints, this instability helps 
to maintain a balance between the institutionalization of the system for regulating movement 
and maintenance of its temporary nature.
Indeed, the fact that the employees have a contract stipulating their hours, their hourly wage, 
and the type of work for which they are paid is a regulating element that contributes to the 
institutionalization and entrenchment of the system. At the same time, outsourcing maintains 
the “extended temporary” and deeply unilateral nature of the separation policy by offering a 
means to supervise the labor force without the state having to provide any sort of guarantees 
as regards the future operation of these places. This aspect moreover convinced the National 
Labor Court of the need to subcontract overland crossing points, including those located at the 
entrance to the Gaza Strip. The Court ratified the argument that “subcontracted employment 
of nearly all staff on these premises is required to allow flexibility and adjustment to the 
management dynamics of crossings which depends, among other things, on the evolution 
of the political and security situation which are beyond the scope of the Authority.”98 This 
system proved highly efficient when the blockade was imposed on the Gaza Strip. A former 
inspector told me that she had started working at the Erez checkpoint in 2005. “At first, we 
had 12-hour time slots. That suited us because it gave us overtime, but it didn’t last long. (…) 
After the blockade began, things changed completely. The number of people crossing having 
decreased to a tenth of the previous figure, they started cutting hours. I was finally transferred 
to another checkpoint.”99 Beyond the neoliberal strategy of reorganizing the roles of the state 
and the market, subcontracting reflects the specific aspects of the occupation. The uncertainty 
affecting operators’ jobs and the flexibility imposed on them are directly related to the inherent 
instability of checkpoints, the functioning of which the Israeli government can change from 
one day to the next for political or security reasons.
Commodification of Security Skills
From inspector to private company head and including the instructor hired by training schools, 
there is a whole array of security knowledge and know-how that outsourcing converts into 
valued assets on the labor market.
97 Interview with A., cited.
98 Case 328/07, 2009.
99 Interview with Y., cited.
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Even if checkpoint jobs are rarely considered a “lifelong” profession, due to job instability 
and the physical rigors of training in the case of security guards for instance, work at the 
checkpoints enables young people to highlight an experience gained in the framework of their 
military service, to some degree compensating them for their late arrival on the job market 
and enabling them to gain professional experience quickly. All the inspectors and security 
guards I spoke to were younger than 30 and most of them considered the job as temporary. 
Located in peripheral areas and far from the labor market, checkpoints often provide a job 
opportunity for young people who have no professional training other than that gained during 
their military service and have yet to have any work experience. In a neoliberal social context 
characterized by a gradual increase in social inequalities and discrepancies between the center 
and the periphery,100 this opportunity for a semi-skilled job can enable young people to make 
a small living, or even acquire the necessary material conditions for a certain degree of social 
mobility. Thus, for many inspectors and security guards, work at the checkpoints is a means 
of saving money to help pay for university studies, which are fairly expensive in Israel, while 
others work at the checkpoints while continuing their studies:
“Not everyone has someone in their family who can pay for their education,” a security guard 
of Ethiopian origin at the Sha’ar Efrayim checkpoint told me. In a context characterized by a 
decline in motivation among young people to do their military service,101 this state-sponsored 
employment niche can thus serve as a material reward for those who have completed it, 
particularly in combat units.
Inspectors and security guards are not the only ones who can capitalize on their military 
experience in the job market. As previously mentioned, both private security team leaders 
and Crossing Authority staff usually come out of the state military and security apparatus. The 
stratification of jobs and salaries among inspectors, security guards, team leaders, security 
officers, company managers, and Defense Ministry civil servants follows the formal military 
hierarchy (according to rank/grade) and informal military hierarchy (between combat units 
and non-combat units, as well as within combat units). Redeployment of military knowledge 
and know-how transposes these hierarchies to the civilian sphere and converts them into 
social stratifications by job and salary. For security professionals, the opportunity to translate 
military experience into an asset valued on the job market enables elites to diversify the fields 
in which they exercise power. Thus the stated “demilitarization” of this sphere of activity has 
gone together with a parallel process of “re-militarization” of society, which translates as the 
diffusion of military norms and criteria in the civil sphere. Commodification moreover offers 
opportunities for a “second career” to military personnel who, enjoying the special conditions 
of their sector, retire at the age of 42-45.
The current buoyancy of the security service sector is thus upheld by the very characteristics 
of Israeli society, a society in which the proportion of military personnel compared to the 
population at large is one of the highest in the world. In other words, the development of the 
100 Gardus, 2006; Katz, Degani and Gross (eds), 2008.
101 Hever, 2010: 88-89; Dieckhoff, 2003; Ben Eliezer, 2004.
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private security sector deepens and gives a new form to the militarization of society and the 
blurring of the boundaries between military and civil spheres.
Furthermore, this commodification does not only involve selling concrete knowledge, but 
also, at the international level, selling what is perceived as local expertise in the fight against 
terrorism. According to Gordon, the “Israeli experience” is highly valued on the world market 
for security products, especially since September 11, 2001, because it is deemed compatible 
with a neoliberal and democratic regime.102 This value is advanced in particular by the Israel 
Democracy Institute think tank which claims, “the first thing security product customers want 
to know is if the IDF uses them.”103 Training schools offer courses on the world market inspired 
by “the Israeli experience,” pointing out that the Ministry of Defense is one of their clients. The 
Elite Krav Maga combat school, which trains security guards, offers courses based on martial 
arts and techniques used by IDF and Israeli police counterterrorism units.104 SecuriTeach, 
which offers classes in Arabic and courses on “Arab-Muslim culture, customs and tradition,” 
declares that its founders are veterans of the Israeli security forces and have “long-term personal 
experience in the ‘Muslim sector.’”105 This company is the sole service provider for the Ministry 
of Defense in this area and counts among service providers certified by the Pentagon. Its clients 
include private security firms abroad as well as state security agencies.
Lastly, one of the most significant transformations is the installation of a sophisticated 
technological platform designed to increase the level of security while reducing direct contact 
between operators and the Palestinian population. The new checkpoints are thus equipped 
with biometric identification systems linked to a computer database, various types of scanners, 
detectors, and surveillance cameras. These elements are part of a booming field on the Israeli 
market, that of state-of-the-art security products. Since the 1990s, Israel is the technological 
product exporter with the highest number of start-ups per capita and that also has more 
NASDAQ-listed companies than all the European countries.106 Many of these companies are 
specialized in security products.107 Whereas state investment in education has constantly 
declined since the 1980s,108 certain military units, with generous Defense Ministry funding, 
have specialized in developing security products and technologies. Today they are extremely 
high level scientific training institutions as well as entrepreneurial training centers for in the 
field of high technology,109 proof if need be of the state’s central role in setting up a market for 
technological security products.
102 Gordon, 2009.
103 Nevo and Shur-Shmueli, 2004: 14.
104 http://www.elite-kravmaga.com/
105 http://www.securiteach.com/index_eng.html
106 Senor and Singer, 2009.
107 Gordon, 2009.
108 Hever, 2010: 85-87; Swirski, 2008.
109 Senor and Singer, 2009: 69: “While it’s difficult to get into the top Israeli universities, the nations equivalent 
of Harvard, Princeton and Yale are the IDF’s elite units.”
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Checkpoints are one of the main types of facility fitted with inspection and identification 
technological products. Intended for “low intensity conflicts” and control of a civilian 
population perceived as a security threat, these products have the commercial advantage of 
being malleable, in that they can be used in both military and civilian situations. Since being 
incorporated into the checkpoint inspection system, the biometric identification system, one of 
the most sophisticated in the world, has been redeployed at Ben Gurion International Airport 
to facilitate checks of migrant workers.
The prestige of Israeli security knowledge on the world market also increases the market 
value of these products. The fact of having been used for Israel’s defense system, considered 
professional and experienced in the fight against terrorism, promotes sales abroad.110
This technological platform is part of a worldwide network of inventions, production and 
exchange of security products, knowledge and experience bringing together private companies 
and state institutions at the local and international levels. For instance, the Israeli Ministry of 
Defense purchases technology from private companies in the United States. USAID lends 
scanners to the state of Israel,111 and the Israeli army sells equipment and technology to the 
United States government and private US companies that use it for instance to control the 
border with Mexico.112 This network establishes trade relations among private, state, and 
military actors and encourages the exchange of knowledge between security apparatuses and 
the private market. It also constitutes a field of diplomatic relations within which the same 
actors exchange gifts, make friends and enemies. Lastly, the formation of this network reveals 
the development of new norms of economic and security governmentality based on a policy 
of “zero tolerance” and applied simultaneously by the public and the private sphere.113 
   CONCLUSION
The privatization of security—a quintessential sovereign attribute—is often perceived as a 
paradigmatic example of the retreat and the weakening of the state in the face of market forces 
in the context of globalization. According to this approach, such a process allegedly diminishes 
the power of the nation-state and fundamentally alters relations between the political and 
economic spheres, reflecting the decline of national hegemonies, defeated at once from above 
and below, and their replacement by a global governmentality that imposes neoliberal modes 
of exercise of power.
110 “For each shekel spent on the purchase of weapons and security industry products, these industries’ 
exports increase by between 2.5 and 3 shekels,” Pery and Noybach, cited in Nevo and Shur-Shmueli, 2004: 14.
111 Spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, 2006.
112 Brown, 2009; Ritaine, 2009.
113 Hibou, 2011.
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The study of the reform of border checkpoints challenges this view of the state’s role as well 
as the relationships between the political and the economic spheres in this specific context. 
Examining in detail the concrete means by which checkpoint operations have been outsourced 
helps to demonstrate the links between internal evolutions in Israeli society as regards relations 
between the state, the market, and society, and current changes in the system of occupation. 
It then becomes possible to outline the dynamics of these neoliberal reforms and how they 
relate to local political rationalities.
It thus becomes apparent that outsourcing and commodification are not synonymous with 
a retreat of the state but on the contrary with its redeployment and the reorganization of its 
sphere of intervention and the way it exercises its sovereignty. This redefinition of the role of 
the state enables it to maintain, even to reinforce, its control over the management of border 
checkpoints. The new modes of state intervention are also reflected in the establishment and 
financing of a private security market and in the spread of subcontracted employment.
In this outsourcing process, local particularities and national policies play an important role. 
Far from signifying that national logics have been surpassed by a neoliberal rationality, the 
new border checkpoint management reveals an intertwining of state and market. Outsourcing 
draws on the overlapping of state and security networks, the traditional role of security in Israel 
and the specific aspects of the local political economy. It contributes to a redeployment of the 
political scheme to control the movement of Palestinians by transforming its modus operandi 
and adapting it to changes in Israeli society. The classic binary distinction between state and 
market as homogenous social realities must be put in perspective in this case. Through the 
evocation of individual career paths, the analysis of the web of actors involved in this process 
helps to show how close the links are between state actors, private security firms, and the 
official military and security apparatus.
In the new governmentality taking shape through the outsourcing and commodification of 
checkpoint management, it is a neoliberal rationale that contributes to the redeployment of 
the state, its role and its interventions, in order to transform the system of occupation.114
Translated from the French by Cynthia Schoch
114 This study was carried out with support from the Fonds d’analyse des sociétés politiques (FASOPO - CNRS, 
Fondation nationale des sciences politiques and Université Paris-I).
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